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Abstract. With the advance of technology, Criminal Justice agencies are being 
confronted with an increased need to investigate crimes perpetuated partially or 
entirely over the Internet. These types of crime are known as cybercrimes. In 
order to conceal illegal online activity, criminals often use private browsing fea-
tures or browsers designed to provide total browsing privacy. The use of private 
browsing is a common challenge faced in for example child exploitation inves-
tigations, which usually originate on the Internet. Although private browsing 
features are not designed specifically for criminal activity, they have become a 
valuable tool for criminals looking to conceal their online activity. As such, 
Technological Crime units often focus their forensic analysis on thoroughly 
examining the web history on a computer. Private browsing features and 
browsers often require a more in-depth, post mortem analysis. This often 
requires the use of multiple tools, as well as different forensic approaches to 
uncover incriminating evidence. This evidence may be required in a court of 
law, where analysts are often challenged both on their findings and on the tools 
and approaches used to recover evidence. However, there are very few research 
on evaluating of private browsing in terms of privacy preserving as well as 
forensic acquisition and analysis of privacy preserving internet browsers. 
Therefore in this chapter, we firstly review the private mode of popular internet 
browsers. Next, we describe the forensic acquisition and analysis of Browzar, a 
privacy preserving internet browser and compare it with other popular internet 
browsers. 
Keywords: private browsing, privacy browser forensics, Browzar internet 
browser, forensic acquisition and analysis, live data forensics, post-mortem fo-
rensics 
1 Introduction 
Internet security has been a major and increasing concern for many years. Internet 
security can be compromised not only through the threat of Malware, fraud, system 
intrusion or damage, but also via the tracking of internet activity. In order to combat 
these threats, encryption of data as a default setting is now commonplace. Firewalls 
and Anti-virus programs are essential tools in the fight against computer crime. In-
deed, Internet web browsers are daily used by most individuals and can be found on 
computers, mobile devices, gaming consoles, smart televisions, in wristwatches, cars, 
and home appliances. Web browsers store user information such as the sites visited, 
as well as the date and time of internet searches [1]. In addition to clearing their 
browsing history, users can also prevent storage of such information by using ‘private 
browsing’ features and tools [2]. Users may choose to use private browsing features 
and tools for many reasons, including online gift shopping, testing and debugging 
web sites, and accessing public computers. 
Besides, criminals are using numerous methods to access data in the highly lucra-
tive cybercrime business. Organized crime, as well as individual users, are benefiting 
from the protection of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and private browsers, such as 
Tor, Ice Dragon, Epic Privacy, etc. to carry out illegal activity such as money launder-
ing, drug dealing and the trade of child pornography. Weak security has been identi-
fied and exploited in a number of high profile breaches in recent years. Most notably, 
in 2011, Sony Playstation Network faced a major security breach. Over 77 million 
Playstation accounts were hacked, resulting in 12 million unencrypted credit card 
accounts compromised and the site closure for a month. In 2005, the IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service, USA) faced a data breach that resulted in a reported $50 million in 
fraudulent claims. As well, in 2015, Ashley Maddison, a site for extra marital affairs, 
had 37 million account holders’ details released. Breaches such as these illuminate the 
need for better online security and internet privacy. 
Additionally, the release of National Security Agency (NSA) and Government 
Communications Headquarters UK (GCHQ) documentation by Edward Joseph 
Snowden in 2013 further highlighted the need for improved online security. It is re-
ported that he copied classified information from NSA and Department of Defence 
(DoD) files containing details of numerous global surveillance programs allegedly run 
by the NSA and ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network with the cooperation of telecommu-
nication companies and European governments. Snowden then released this classified 
information to the public. The information contained data and emails on foreign tar-
gets. Google, Microsoft and Facebook were identified as sources of the information 
obtained. Following the Snowden breach, there was public outrage at the lack of pri-
vacy leading to a rise in the number of browsers offering private browsing. News 
articles advising on internet privacy assisted in educating the public and a new era of 
private browsing arose. Although these measures were designed to protect legitimate 
browsing privacy, they also provided a means to conceal illegal activity. 
Although many people use private browsing features for legitimate reasons, some 
users seek out and exploit third party tools designed for Internet search privacy. Alt-
hough not marketed solely as private browsers, Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome 
have ‘private browsing’ modes in which the user can browse the Internet without the 
browser saving Internet histories [3]. 
On the other hand, there are Internet browsers that are marketed based on its ‘total 
browse privacy’. These browsers claim that for instance they does not save cookies, 
temporary history files, passwords, or cache. In addition to the privacy claims, these 
browsers do not require a local installation, and can even be launched from removable 
media, such as an external hard drive. Their features are very appealing for those 
seeking complete online anonymity, as well as for those users who intend to commit 
criminal acts online, such as child exploitation. However, there are very few research-
es on evaluating of private browsing in terms of privacy preserving as well as forensic 
acquisition and analysis of privacy preserving feature of “total browse privacy” inter-
net browsers. Therefore, in this chapter, we firstly review the private mode of popular 
internet browsers. Next, we describe the forensic acquisition and analysis of a privacy 
preserving internet browsers Browzar, and compare it with popular internet browsers. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 shows the background of 
this research including related work in this domain. We present the forensic 
acquisition and analysis methods of Browzar privacy browser in Section 3. We de-
scribe our experimental results and discussion of analysing Browzar privacy browser 
in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and discuss on future work in Section 5. 
2 Background 
The availability and popularity of the “Internet” has grown exponentially since the 
1990s. In 1995, an estimated 16 million users had access to the Internet - a mere 0.4% 
of the world’s population. As of December 2015, it was estimated that over 3 billion 
users had access to the Internet, accounting for approximately 46% of the world’s 
population [4]. People connect to the Internet using multiple devices, multiple times a 
day. Whether it’s on a personal or work computer, a mobile device, or on a smart 
watch, millions of users perform various online activities every day. One of the most 
common activities is using the Internet to perform searches for information. The most 
popular search engine, Google, is estimated to process over 40,000 search queries 
every second. This translates to over 3.5 billion searches per day, and 1.2 trillion 
searches per year worldwide [5]. Unfortunately, with its rise in popularity, the Internet 
has created a new form of criminal activity, often referred to as ‘cybercrime’. 
Cybercrimes have been defined in various ways, but are generally categorized into 
one of the following two types of Internet-related crime: ‘advanced cybercrime’ and 
‘cyber-enabled crime’ [6]. Advanced cybercrimes are attacks against computer hard-
ware and software, whereas cyber-enabled crimes are ‘traditional’ crimes that have 
been enabled by and have taken new form with the advent of the Internet. Cyber-
enabled crimes include crimes against children, financial crimes, and terrorism. Inter-
national agencies have identified cybercrimes as an issue. The European Union's law 
enforcement agency, Europol, for example, notes that the Internet is a major source of 
criminal activity. Europol suggests that the Internet enables organized crime groups to 
access large pools of victims and to carry out a diverse range of the criminal acts on 
large scales and in shorter periods of time [7]. The obscure nature of the criminal 
activity makes it very challenging for law enforcement not only to catch criminals 
using the Internet, but also to successfully pursue prosecution. In an effort to avoid 
detection and prosecution by law enforcement agencies, criminals resort to using 
various tools and tactics to conceal their illegal online activity. These tools and tactics 
often leave little to no evidence behind. 
2.1 Internet Security 
Online transactions have become a normal part of everyday internet activity. Whether 
it is buying, banking or socializing using the desktop, smartphone or tablet, our per-
sonal information, documents and habits would be vulnerable to public exposure 
without internet security. Firewalls and Anti-Virus programs are now essential tools 
in the fight against cybercrime. As criminals become more aware of and adept at us-
ing anti-forensic tools such as encryption, obfuscation and programs such as CCleaner 
[8] which is used to wipe any trace of data on a hard drive, forensic investigators have 
to keep up with the ever changing cybercrime landscape. In the past, investigators on 
warrant were routinely told to ‘pull the plug’ on any devices found on scene and de-
liver them to forensic examiners for analysis. To do this now could mean the loss of 
valuable live data and automatic encryption of the hard drive. Remote wipe applica-
tions are now also included on many mobile devices so the judgement call of balanc-
ing the need to secure the network to prevent remote wipe codes being transmitted, 
with the possibility of acquiring data from either a protected drive or cloud based 
data, has never been more crucial. 
The publication, Understanding Internet Security [9] by BigPlanet, states that over 
90% of internet users have spyware lurking on their computers without their 
knowledge, delivered by a number of different methods. Websites carrying malicious 
code account for a large majority of attacks in the form of adware or spyware. Email 
attachments can also execute code to infect a user’s computer by way of a virus, 
worm or allow remote access to be established. 
2.2 Forensic Analysis and Web Browser 
According to Oh et al., a crucial component of a digital forensic investigation is 
searching for evidence left by web browsing. Each movement taken by a suspect us-
ing a web browser can leave a recoverable trace on the computer. Analysing this in-
formation can produce a variety of artifacts, such as web sites visited, time and fre-
quency of access, and keyword searches performed by the suspect [10]. 
Oh et al. further state that in a Web browser forensic investigation, the simple pars-
ing of information is not enough. Additional forensic techniques may be required to 
extract more significant information such as “the keyword searches and the overall 
user activity”. For example, depending on the possible user activities during a single 
browser session (i.e., email, online banking, blogging), investigators must analyse the 
information generated from each browser using the same timeline. 
Web browser history and analysis has become an increasingly important area of 
computer forensics. As techniques advance and new tools become available to exam-
ine web browsers, investigators are able to reconstruct timelines, identify suspect 
browsing habits, and recover evidence of crimes. Furthermore, the results uncovered 
during web browser forensics can determine the objective, methods, and criminal 
activities of a suspect. 
2.3 Privacy Browsing 
Although private browsing has legitimate uses, such as activity on multiple user de-
vices and political restrictions, many individuals are using the shield of anonymity to 
carry out illegal activity on the Internet. Private browsing is designed in some web 
browsers to disable browsing history and the web cache. This allows a user to browse 
the Web without storing data on their system that could be retrieved by investigators. 
Privacy mode also disables the storage of data in cookies and browsing history data-
bases. This protection is only available to the local device as it is still possible to iden-
tify websites visited by associating the IP (Internet Protocol) address at the website. 
Apple introduced the first Internet privacy features in a browser in 2005 in the web 
browser Safari [11]. Since this time, ‘privacy features’ or ‘privacy modes’ have be-
come standard in most Internet web browsers. Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and 
Internet Browser each also have private browsing features. 
Boneh, et al. [12] examined private browsing features introduced by four popular 
browsers: Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Apple Safari. The 
authors noted that private browsing modes have two goals:  
1) to ensure sites visited while browsing in private leave no trace on the user’s 
computer;  
2) to hide a user’s identity from web sites they visit by, for example, making it 
difficult for web sites to link the user’s activities in private mode to the us-
er’s activities in public mode. 
The research also identified the inconsistencies when using private mode with the 
popular browsers and revealed that, although all major browsers support private 
browsing, inconsistency in the type of privacy provided by each differs greatly. Fire-
fox and Chrome attempt to protect against both web and local attacks while Safari 
only prevents local issues [12]. 
Although legitimate reasons do exist for using private browsing, some users take 
advantage of these features to conceal criminal activity. 
Erik Larkin explains that a typical private browsing session is initiated from within 
the interface of the main browser [2]. Once initiated, it is carried out in its own private 
browsing session window until the session is terminated. While in a private browsing 
session, no updates are made to the browser history, and upon terminating the session, 
the browser will delete any cookies stored during the session. This will also clear the 
download list. Larkin suggests that while these features do add privacy, they will not 
completely cover a user’s tracks. 
Hedberg’s research led to similar findings and suggests that there are many mis-
conceptions about private browsing [13]. To the end user, private modes and private 
browsers typically perform as advertised. However, using a series of web browser 
forensic techniques and tools, Hedberg proved that claims of total browse privacy are 
false. During his research involving the private modes for the Google Chrome, Mozil-
la Firefox and Microsoft Internet Explorer browsers, Hedberg successfully recovered 
artifacts for each browser from within the hard drive and memory of the system. 
Well known browsers such as Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, Safari and 
Mozilla Firefox rely on similar methods to ensure speed and popularity of their prod-
uct. Web Cache is a popular way of storing data that can be easily and quickly ac-
cessed, thereby negating the necessity to find data that has already been used. History 
databases, thumbnails (small stored images), temporary files and cookies (user and 
site specific data) all help to speed up the user experience and, in their path, leave a 
plethora of artefact evidence for examiners to feast on. Many studies have been car-
ried out in this area and free tools, such as ChromeHistoryView, ChromeCacheView, 
IECacheView, as well as forensic software such as Internet Evidence Finder, are 
available to automate the examination process. All the above browsers have the op-
tion to operate in private mode. Research by Khanikekar [14] indicates that the use of 
Internet Explorer in ‘Protected Mode’ runs a ‘Low Privilege’ process, preventing the 
application writing to areas of the system that require higher privilege. 
2.4 Browzar 
Browzar Internet browser [16] was designed to offer total browse privacy for users. It 
was designed and marketed for individuals to browse the Internet in a private way – 
either on a personal or shared computer. Browzar claims that it does not save any 
information to the local system – and even includes an automatic purging feature to 
remove any information left behind upon terminating a browsing session. Browzar is 
an Internet Explorer (IE) shell browser, so Internet Explorer is required on the host 
system for it to function. Further, it does not require a standard installation; instead, it 
can be launched from a removable media device, or even from the vendor website. 
Working in computer forensics, it is common for investigators to rely on the recovery 
of Internet evidence to solidify investigations and prosecution. Presently, there is little 
documented research on Browzar and its privacy claims. This chapter will challenge 
the key selling points advertised by Browzar. Various experiments will be conducted 
as part of a full forensic analysis to determine if any artifacts are left behind on a sys-
tem after using Browzar. Additional comparisons will be made to the Google Chrome 
and Mozilla Firefox browsers to identify similarities in artifact preservation. More 
details can be found in the following sections. 
3 Forensic acquisition and analysis of Browzar privacy browser  
In this chapter, we aim to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. Is Browzar capable of providing complete privacy to users, avoiding all fo-
rensic techniques? With claims of total browse privacy, it is important to 
confirm whether Browzar performs as advertised simply from an end user’s 
stand point, or if it actually can avoid all forensic techniques, including 
memory analysis, tools specific to web browser forensics, and a full forensic 
analysis using software such as X-Ways. 
2. How does Browzar privacy compare to Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox 
privacy modes? This will help determine if the Browzar product works better 
or worse than most private modes that are now standard in many Internet 
browsers. This comparison will also help to identify whether or not Browzar 
could be deemed an anti-forensic web browser. 
3. What evidence was recoverable during post-mortem analysis of Browzar? 
The most common type of analysis occurs after a device is seized. The post 
mortem analysis of Browzar will benefit investigators and offer recommen-
dations on analysing data using specific tools such as web browser forensic 
tools. Further, post mortem analysis enables access to database files and in-
formation found in unallocated space – information that would otherwise not 
be available during a live or logical preview. 
4. What evidence was recoverable during live state analysis of Browzar? Inves-
tigators today are increasingly facing situations that no longer allow them to 
unplug a system and perform a traditional hard drive acquisition. The infor-
mation captured in the memory of a system is considered volatile infor-
mation - which is information that is lost once the host system is powered 
off. This data is extremely important and useful as it can often help deter-
mine the most recent activities on a computer – including browser specific 
findings such keyword searches and website history. 
3.1 Adopted Approach 
The following approach was adopted to address the questions posed above. Based on 
the nature of this research subject, various approaches and tools were used to recover 
and analyse information. 
Change monitoring is a useful technique used to determine the impact a specific 
program or action has on a system. With respect to web browsers, change monitoring 
can help determine any modifications that the browser is making to the system, and, 
in turn, identify the system files and registry keys being changed as a result of a par-
ticular action. Further to this, a virtual environment is ideal for testing different ver-
sions of a browser and for validating findings. 
Live data forensics is an increasingly important aspect of computer forensic inves-
tigations. The objective of live data forensics is to minimize impacts to the integrity of 
data while collecting volatile evidence from the suspect system. The primary source 
of volatile information is contained within the RAM of a system. Information residing 
is RAM is stored there on a temporary basis. Once the host system is powered off, the 
data is cleared from the RAM and lost forever. Forensic tools have been developed 
that allow investigators to capture and process the data stored in RAM. As part of the 
experiments performed in this research, the host system will be treated as a real world 
exhibit. Using forensic techniques and tools, the RAM will be captured in a forensic 
manner and preserved for further analysis. Various tools will be used to process and 
analyse the contents of the RAM for web browser specific evidence. 
Post mortem analysis often provides the best opportunity to gather the most evi-
dence in a digital forensic investigation. The post mortem forensic process begins 
with a data acquisition. This involves creating bit by bit forensic duplicates of any 
digital evidence. These forensic duplicates not only protect the integrity of the origi-
nal data, but also enable additional information to be recovered from deleted and 
slack space. Software tools, such as X-Ways, are then used to process and categorize 
the information as part of the forensic analysis. With respect to web browsers, full 
forensic software like X-Ways include features designed to parse out web browser 
databases and any other relevant metadata.  
3.2 Experimental environments 
 
The results outlined in this minor thesis were obtained using two separate working 
environments. The first environment was created using an Apple Mac Mini computer. 
Apples Boot Camp program was used to configure the system to allow a dual boot 
configuration – thus enabling an installation of the Windows 7 operating system (ser-
vice pack 1). All available Windows 7 updates – both security and software – were 
performed using the Windows Update feature to ensure a complete up to date working 
environment. The operating system was installed on a 75 GB VMware virtual ma-
chine (VMware Workstation 12 Pro). The virtual machine served two purposes: to 
create an isolated working environment and to allow the system to be reverted back to 
an earlier date (i.e., snapshot) if necessary. 
Change monitoring tools including Process Monitor (Procmon) and Index.dat Ana-
lyzer were installed in the virtual environment. Microsoft explains Process Monitor as 
an “advanced monitoring tool for Windows that shows real-time file system, Registry 
and process/thread activity”. Internet Explorer, which is native to Windows 7, also 
remained as part of the environment. It should be noted that Browzar was tested using 
Internet Explorer versions 9 through 11. Although compatible with each version, there 
are instances where results were gathered using only Internet Explorer version 9. De-
pending on the stability and compatibility, certain results may have been gathered 
using Internet Explorer versions 10 or 11. 
To further analyse the behaviour of each browser, a second testing environment 
was created using a Dell Latitude E6430 laptop containing a 120 GB OCZ solid state 
hard drive and 4 GB of RAM. The system was left connected to the Internet for sev-
eral days, all while actively using various search engines to perform specific web 
activity. These secure sites required a successful login with a username and password. 
After approximately 48 hours, the system memory (RAM) was acquired using the 
dumpit.exe tool, and the system was successfully shut down using a proper shutdown 
sequence. 
3.3 Keyword Search Terms 
Figure 1 shows the key search terms and websites used to perform a series of specific 
searches during the forensic analysis. 
 
Fig.1 Search criteria used during testing 
 
4 Experiments and analysis 
4.1 Change Monitoring 
4.1.1 Browzar 
Contrary to the successful research findings discovered for Google Chrome and 
Mozilla Firefox, limited information pertaining to Browzar was found. Therefore, the 
best source of information would be from testing the product itself. Upon completing 
the initial setup of the virtual machine, Browzar version 2.0 (Windows Style Theme) 
was downloaded directly from the vendor website. The installation file, as advertised, 
was around 200kb in size and took only seconds to download in its entirety. 
Using Procmon, the file system and registry changes were examined to determine 
the footprint of the Browzar installation. A Browzar session was initiated in order to 
visit various websites and to perform the keyword searches outlined above. This ac-
tivity was designed to populate the system with random Internet artifacts, such as 
pictures, keyword searches, cookies, etc. Procmon values were created for browzar-
winstyle2000.exe and iexplore.exe to help filter results. Although no results were 
registered for the iexplore.exe value during the launch, plenty of activity was logged 
for browzarwinstyle2000.exe (Figure 2) 
 
 
Fig.2 Activity logs of Browzar 
The Browzar interface, originally modelled after Mozilla Firefox, is similar in ap-
pearance to a typical Internet browser. Upon further inspection, differences emerged. 
Various privacy features such as a separate field for private searches, as well as Se-
cure Delete and Force Cleanup options were present (Figure 3). 
Similar to other Microsoft Internet Explorer shell browsers, much of Browzar’s ac-
tivity involved the registry, specifically with the following keys: 
 
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\InternetExplorer 
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings  
• HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\InternetExplorer 
 
A review of the file system activity in Procmon revealed that various files were be-
ing created on a temporary basis upon starting Browzar. To illustrate this further, a 
Browzar folder was created in C:\Users\21\AppData\Roaming which contained a 
single file called recovery.lck (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Fig.3 Browzar privacy features 
 
 
Fig.4 Procmon results for BrowzarWinstyle2000.exe 
Browzar claims that the recovery.lck contains a date and time stamp of the precise 
moment the Browzar session began [11]. It states further that this file contains no 
information about websites visited during a Browzar session. As advertised, any rem-
nants of these findings were purged upon closing the browsing session (Figure 5). 
File operations were also monitored using Process Monitor to determine what in-
formation was being written to the disk. The majority of information being written 
during the Browzar session was to the following locations: 
 
• C:\Users\21\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies 
• C:\Users\21\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\TemporaryInternetFiles\Co
ntent.IE5 
The index.dat file, which is located in the Content.IE5 folder, is used by Internet 
Explorer version 9 as a repository for information such as websites, search queries, 
and recently opened files (Figure 6). 
 
Fig.5 Before and after illustration of deleted temporary Browzar folder 
 
 
Fig.6 Procmon activity showing create, read, write and close operations 
During the Browzar session, the index.dat file showed continuous create, read, and 
write operation activity (Figure 5). Upon terminating the session, additional close 
operation activity to the index.dat file was observed. 
To illustrate this further, the www.nfl.com website was accessed using Browzar. 
During the browsing session, the index.dat file was accessed using Index.dat Analyzer 
v2.5. It contained evidence of the www.nfl.com url as well as additional artifacts such 
as .png and .jpg files from the website. (Figure 7) 
 
 
Fig.7 Index.dat Analyzer results showing www.nfl.com artifacts 
Upon closing the browsing session, all the information was removed from the in-
dex.dat (Figure 8). 
 
Fig.8 Index.dat Analyzer showing www.nfl.com artifacts were removed 
Prior to terminating the Browzar session, the Secure Delete and Force Cleanup op-
tions were initiated and then terminated by exiting the browsing session using the File 
menu. 
4.1.2 Chrome and Firefox 
 
Using the Chrome and Firefox private modes, the remaining searches and web activi-
ty assigned to each browser based on Figure 3 was carried out. Chrome and Firefox 
browsers were creating and using SQLite databases to store browsing information, as 
evident from the Procmon results. These SQLite files were analyzed using X-Ways 
and Oxygen forensic software programs. The Oxygen Forensic software is a mobile 
forensic software typically used for extracting and analyzing cell phones, 
smartphones, and other mobile devices. However, it also contains a built in SQLite 
viewer that parses out and presents the information stored in an SQLite database file. 
While observing the installation of Chrome and Firefox, it was also documented that 
user profiles for each browser were generated as part of the installation (see Figure 
15). Both browsers allowed for multiple user profiles using their own SQLite database 
files, enabling individual users the ability to collect their own bookmarks, store pass-
words, and history.  
4.2 Forensic acquisition 
4.2.1 Live Data Forensics 
 
To successfully capture the RAM, a 32 GB Lexar USB thumb drive was forensically 
wiped and loaded with the dumpit.exe utility. Using the dumpit.exe utility, the RAM 
capture was initiated, storing the output directly to the previously forensically wiped 
32 Lexar USB thumb drive. 
 
4.2.2 Post-Mortem Data Acquisition 
 
In order to acquire information from the hard drive of the Dell Laptop, a forensic data 
acquisition was performed. The hard drive was removed from the laptop and connect-
ed via a USB tableau write blocker to a forensic analysis machine. Using FTK Imager 
version 3.4.2.2 forensic software, the data acquisition process was performed. The 
electronic information contained on computer storage media must be acquired by 
making a complete physical copy of every bit of data located on the computer media 
in a manner that does not alter that information. The integrity of the data is authenti-
cated at the end of the acquisition using the MD5 hashing algorithm. This hashing 
process creates a 128 bit hash value of the data - which is often referred to in comput-
er forensics as the digital fingerprint - to ensure the acquired electronic information is 
an exact duplicate of the storage media. For this particular acquisition, the forensic 
duplicate of the hard drive was created using the Encase image file format - known as 
E01. 
4.3 Forensic analysis 
4.3.1 Browzar - Memory Analysis 
 
 During the data processing stage, IEF was used to process the RAM and search for 
artifacts pertaining to the Browzar specific search strings outlined in Figure 3. IEF 
recovered several Google Searches performed using Browzar (Figure 9). By further 
analysing the memory using X-Ways, additional keyword searches were identified. 
For example, through X-Ways, six instances of the term "beer" were recovered. 
 
 
Fig.9 IEF results showing recovered google search for “beer” 
Similar results were also identified for the other search terms. Residual artifacts 
found in RAM such as these are often left behind while the browsing session remains 
active and stored in RAM. By performing this additional examination, it illustrates the 
importance for forensic analysts to perform manual data checks and also the im-
portance of validating findings using a second forensic tool. 
4.3.2 Browzar – Post Mortem Analysis 
 
Considerable findings were also uncovered during post mortem analysis for Browzar 
in the pagefile.sys. The pagefile is used by the Windows operating system as an ex-
tension of random access memory. For example, the pagefile is often accessed when a 
computer system’s RAM is completely full. The operating system views this file as 
actual physical memory, allowing for quicker access to applications stored within it 
compared to if they remained in their original location. In this instance, Pagefile find-
ings were recovered using IEF and X-Ways and included keyword searches, web 
history, and images from webpages. 
In addition to the findings in the pagefile, several instances of the Browzar folder 
were discovered (see Figure 6). One of the instances containing a recover.lck file was 
examined. The majority of this file was not legible in X-Ways and it did not contain 
any stored websites - as claimed by Browzar [10]. However, one section that refer-
enced a WebCachev01.tmp file was discovered (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
Fig.10 WebCachev01.tmp reference found in recovery.lck file 
This prompted the researcher to locate and analyze the WebCachev01.dat file. The 
WebCachev01.dat file is used by Internet Explorer (version 10 and higher) to main-
tain the web cache, history, and cookies. A review of this file in X-Ways uncovered 
more references to the keywords used during the Browzar session, confirming that 
Browzar is leaving traces of activity behind (Figure 11). In addition to these findings, 
Browzar’s private search feature revealed that all searches were performed using a 
www.google.co.uk address. 
 
Fig.11 Evidence of Browzar searches found in WebCachev01.dat 
To investigate this further, Wireshark tool was used to perform a series of tests. 
Wireshark is a free and open source network protocol analyzer for Unix and Win-
dows. By capturing the browsing session using Wireshark, the data packets sent to 
and from the test environment during the Browzar session were reviewed and filtered. 
Based on the results of these tests, it was evident that Browzar was not leaking any 
session information and that the private search feature found on the Browzar interface 
was simply a “Google Custom Search” engine – a feature that was hardcoded into the 
tool. 
4.3.3 Google Chrome - Memory Analysis 
 
Although minimal, several findings of interest relating to the Chrome private session 
were recovered during the analysis of the system memory. By filtering the results 
using the keyword "football", IEF recovered a user generated Google search involving 
this word. Similar discoveries were made during a manual examination using X-Ways 
(Figure 12). 
 
 
Fig.12 Sample Chrome results found using X-Ways 
4.3.4 Google Chrome – Post Mortem Analysis 
 
The Pagefile.sys file contained some of the most valuable information recovered from 
the Chrome private browsing session. For example, various keyword searches used 
during the Chrome session were recovered in the pagefile. In addition to keyword 
searches, urls, bookmarks, and images were all discovered in the pagefile. To illus-
trate this further, the evidence returned by IEF was filtered for the search term "base-
ball" and it hit on the following 10 images. Several bookmarks were created during 
the private browsing session. It is to be noted that these bookmarks remained availa-
ble during subsequent normal (not private) browsing sessions. These were easily re-
coverable using IEF and X-Ways via bookmarks SQLite database file (Figure 13). 
 
 
 
Fig.13 Illustration showing references to Chrome bookmarks in X-Ways and in Chrome 
The remaining Chrome SQLite databases were examined, but did not contain any 
information related to the private browsing session. Aside from the residual content 
left behind in memory and the spillage found in the pagefile, Chrome did a good job 
of discarding any traces of activity, and certainly performed as advertised from the 
viewpoint of the end user. 
 
4.3.5 Mozilla Firefox - Memory Analysis 
 
IEF was used to process the RAM and search for evidence pertaining to the Firefox 
specific criteria outlined in Figure 3. IEF was able to recover several Yahoo searches 
performed during the Firefox browsing session. In addition to keyword searches, urls, 
bookmarks and images were also identified among the IEF results. 
 
4.3.5 Mozilla Firefox – Post Mortem Analysis 
 
Post mortem analysis was performed for Firefox using X-Ways. Once again, the 
pagefile.sys contained a wealth of information. From within the pagefile, urls, parsed 
search queries, and pictures were recovered (Figure 14). To gain a fuller picture of the 
activity performed during the Firefox session, evidence of a search for "South Africa" 
extended beyond the recovered parsed search queries. For example, multiple images – 
both full and partial - were recovered from the pagefile that originated while browsing 
South African travel websites. With respect to bookmarks, several were created dur-
ing the private browsing session. It is to be noted that these bookmarks remained 
available during subsequent normal (not private) browsing sessions (Figure 15). 
 
 
Fig.14 Sample IEF result showing searches for South Africa 
The remaining Firefox SQLite databases were examined, but did not contain any 
information related to the private browsing session. Aside from the residual content 
left behind in memory, and the information found in the pagefile, Firefox did not store 
information on the system. From an end user’s perspective, the Firefox private brows-
ing feature also performed as advertised. 
 
 
 
  
Fig.15 Illustration showing references to Firefox bookmarks in Firefox and Oxygen SQLite 
Viewer 
4.4 Discussion 
The results of this chapter will serve to fill the gap in knowledge regarding the foren-
sic analysis of the browser, Browzar. Based on the results, it was concluded that pri-
vate browsing artifacts are recoverable. All three browsers tested as part of this minor 
thesis reduced the amount of information left behind after usage, and were sufficient 
at minimizing and preventing the amount of data stored on the host system. However, 
none of the browsers tested were capable of fully preventing or controlling what in-
formation remained in the memory of the system and the pagefile. In this section, we 
discuss on the research questions we raised in Section 3: 
1. Is Browzar capable of providing complete privacy to users, avoiding all fo-
rensic techniques? 
To the end user, the product performed as advertised. Upon closing the 
browsing session, it removed all traces of web browser activity. However, 
using a combination of forensic tools and techniques, evidence, including 
pictures, keyword searches, and urls, were easily recovered in both the 
memory and in the pagefile of the test system. 
2. How does Browzar privacy compare to Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox 
privacy modes? 
Out of the three browsers forensically examined for this minor thesis, Brow-
zar was found to leave the most information behind. Not only were artifacts 
recovered from various locations, it also left a folder named Browzar behind 
on the system. This folder was instrumental in pointing to further evidence, 
leading to a more successful forensic examination. 
3. What evidence was recoverable during live state analysis of Browzar? 
Live analysis, although not always an option available to investigators 
proved to contain valuable evidence in this case. From within RAM, evi-
dence of keyword searching, websites visited, and pictures were recovered. 
In certain cases pictures were not fully recoverable, but they helped demon-
strate the interests and activity being performed during the browsing session. 
4. What evidence was recoverable during post-mortem analysis in relation to 
Browzar? 
Using X-Ways and IEF as primary tools, several additional artifacts were re-
covered. Files and folders left behind by Browzar were recovered using 
manual techniques from within X-Ways. The WebCacheV01.dat and Page-
file.sys files proved to contain a wealth of information - including evidence 
of Browzar keyword searches, websites visited, and pictures. 
 
5 Conclusions and future work 
 
 
In this paper, we examine Browzar, which claims to be a browser specifically de-
signed for privacy, comparing results to the built in private browsing modes in 
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox Internet browsers. This chapter also provided 
elaborate and detailed answers relating to the forensically recoverable information for 
each web browser tested. The results of this research are useful to, and may be refer-
enced by, forensic experts involved in investigations concerning web activity on both 
desktop and mobile platforms [17, 18, 19, 20]. Each question posed in the problem 
statement was addressed and the underlying data presented in subsequent sections 
should help not only investigators looking for a better general understanding of web 
browser forensics, but also those seeking advanced techniques and methods for re-
covering, parsing and analysing web browser specific data. Some topics for further 
scientific and practical research are coming up. First of all, investigators can use fo-
rensic method proposed in this chapter to examine other privacy Internet browsers 
such as Epic Privacy Browser (https://www.epicbrowser.com/). Next, this research 
also assists the studying of website fingerprinting [21, 22]. Besides, we are looking at 
using clustering methods and tree-based approach [23, 24, 25] to group correlated 
artifacts from Browzar to deeply analyze the evidence. Moreover, experimental re-
sults described in this paper can assist the researchers who are studying for new 
methods of preserving the privacy in the next generation of web browser and mobile 
apps [26]. 
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